Tying loose ends
This morning I finished my last session here in Zamboanga, where most of the teachers in the Ateneo de Zamboanga Grade School, based on the survey results have a predominantly contextualist world view. It’s a weird thing considering that they’re a Grade School and that they’re outside Metro Manila. You would ordinarily expect to find such sophistication in a high school in the National Capital Region. Needless to say, the group was thrilled when I mentioned this even if I qualified that the hierarchy of epistemological world views is under debate.
What have I learned in this morning’s discussion as well as yesterday’s session with the Ateneo de Zamboanga High School? Anything new? Anything novel? An a-ha experience of any sort?
I’m beginning to understand better the links that have been established between epistemological world views and beliefs: For example, the notion of knowledge as simple and certain and an uncritical reliance on Authority (from the Schommer and Chan and Elliott frameworks) are features of an Absolutist World View. The three big ideas on the “development” of world views about knowing indicate this:
a) Chai (2006): Epistemological development is characterized by two movements. First, a growing recognition of the complexity and uncertainty of knowledge. This objective conception of knowledge as simple and certain is accompanied by a heavy reliance on authority and a naive expectation that every question corresponds to a single correct answer); and second, the increasingly important role of the knower as an agent relative to authority and external sources of knowledge. In the second relativist stage, the knower accepts the complexity and uncertainty of knowledge but relegates knowledge claims to matters of individual preference. In other words, Authority has been replaced by Opinion. In the final evaluativist stage, the acceptance of knowledge as complex and uncertain leads not to an abandonment of evaluation, but a commitment to the responsibility of evaluating knowledge claims based on Evidence and others’–including experts’–opinions.
b) Baxter-Magolda (2004) and King and Kitchener (2004) explain these movements further: There are two epistemological shifts that happen. The first pertains to one’s view about the nature of knowledge–i.e., “a disillusionment with the black and white and a discovery of gray areas.” This shift in one’s notion of knowledge leads to a more active role of the knower, an “end to enslavement to authority.” No longer does the knower merely receive absolute truths from authority, byt now constructs truths. But because these constructed truths are not supported by evidence, they are mere PERSONAL or SUBJECTIVE TRUTHS (hence, the subjectivist/relativist/multiplist stance).
The second shift pertains to the construction of REASONED TRUTHS, made possible only when the knower uses EVIDENCE to evaluate which of the multiple truths or knowledge claims is preferable. One’s “rebellion against authority” is now tempered because authority now facilitates the construction of reasoned truths. Authority is no longer regarded as always “speaking ex cathedra” (i.e., infallible); it is respected, but subjected to scrutiny.
c) Kuhn & Park: Epistemological Development is presented as the coordination of the Objective and the Subjective. As one transitions from one level to the next, the objective and subjective dimensions of knowing become increasingly coordinated and balanced. From absolutist to multiplist, the order of change begins with the softer domains (personal tastes, aesthetics, even values) and ends with the “harder” ones (social truths and especially physical truths). This order is reversed when it comes to the next shift, from the multiplist to evaluativist, so that the change begins with the physical truths and social truths to the softer domains.
More importantly, I’m able to make better sense of the roles of Authority, Opinion, and Evidence in terms of the world views. To wit:
* Knowledge in any given field, discipline, or domain somehow involves all three (A, O, and E) in the justification of knowledge. However, the role each one plays vis-a-vis one another varies from discipline to discipline. E.g., the roles of Authority, Opinion, and Evidence differ in Art, Morality, Social Sciences, Physical Sciences, and Religion. For example, in the Physical Sciences, Evidence would take precedence over Authority, followed by Opinion (which still has a role to play!). On the other hand, in Morality, for example, given its nature, Evidence may not play such a primary or even exclusive role. What precisely are their roles will need some more reflection and study.
* The dynamics of these three arbiters of knowledge or the bases for justification of knowledge have a lot to do with one constitutes knowledge in a given field. For example, scientific knowledge as distinguished from social scientific knowledge, morality, religion, etc.
There are actually more loose ends to think about.
strugglingSCHOLAR 