Image via Wikipedia

One of my research questions has to do with what sociologists call “religiosity.”  An instrument developed by Gottlieb (2007) assesses the following five measures of religiosity:  religious self-identification (“How religious are you?”), religious beliefs (i.e., in God’s existence and the afterlife), religious practices, religious values, and religious background.  The problem with the questionnaire is that there are only ten items designed to measure the above, resulting in an average of two items per measure.

Interesting:  A factor analysis was performed on the responses of 1,068 school teachers, and three factors loaded.   Prior to the stat, I had actually hoped there would only be two, to be neatly labeled as Personal Religiosity and Family Religiosity.  If you read the items, most of them inquire about the respondent, while the last three are about his/her family background, so the two categories make a lot of sense.

As it turned out, three factors emerged, which I’ve decided to label in this manner:  Personal Religiosity, Religious Beliefs, and Family Religiosity.

What was not expected was the way items for Religious Self-identification, Religious Practices, and Religious Values loaded together.   But it makes sense:  Religious practices, religious values, and self-identification may not be distinct constructs, as initially thought.

It was also not immediately clear why the two items on Religious Beliefs loaded separately from those clustered together under Personal Religiosity.   Perhaps there is a distinction between religious beliefs on the one hand and religious practices and values on the other.  Religious beliefs do not automatically translate to religious practices and values.  In other words, just because one subscribes to particular religious beliefs—even if strongly—does not necessarily mean that one holds the corresponding values or engages in the expected religious practices.

Interestingly, the item on the family’s religious practices registered the highest number of moderate to strong correlations—specifically, with the items on:  (a) Religious self-identification, (b) regular attendance of church services, (c) value of religious customs and practices, (d) value of same religion in marriage, (e) father’s religiosity, and (f) mother’s religiosity.  This pattern hints at two things:   First, parental religiosity (e and f) is obviously related to the the family’s religious practices.  Secondly, the religious practices of one’s family is an important determinant in a person’s overall religiosity.

Yesterday on the train to Oxford and back to Paddington, I re-read David Moshman’s 2007 article.  Interesting especially because of two fresh insights of his that I hadn’t noticed in my first reading:

First, that children develop epistemic cognition but only thw type that pertains to particular judgments and specific matters. Only in adolescence and adulthood do general epistemological theories develop–i.e., epistemological worldviews and beliefs.

Secondly, that academic disciplines (even Kuhn’s 5 domains of judgments) differ from Moshman’s three domains which develop even in childhood. There may be a need to make this distinction in my paper.

I’ve also been studying the statistical analysis provided by Tony Zosa.  Some patterns and trends are unpredicted and therefore interesting, giving rise to questions:

1. Why do the older and experienced teachers relatively more “naïve” than their younger, less experienced colleagues? They tend to question authority less. They tend to view scientific knowledge as more certain and scientific truth more attainable as long as there’s effort. They seem more concerned about students learning facts than understanding them or learning how to learn on their own. Finally, they seem to believe that academic success is contingent on and limited by innate ability!

2. Why do teachers teaching in the higher grades and year levels (especially those in high school) relatively more sophisticated in their epistemological beliefs? Is this a function of the material they tackle etc.?3. What about gender, discipline, conceptions about teaching/learning, and religiosity? Still pending.

I wish I could just stop everything and focus on these questions. We haven’t even looked at Part 1 and Part 3!

There have been two positive developments lately with regard to my research, the workload notwithstanding. First, I got a couple of emails from my statistics consultant, Tony Zosa, and he seems genuinely excited about the data emerging from the statistical analysis. I obviously don’t understand all of it yet, but he seems to believe that his choice of statistical tools is superior to those of Chan & Elliott. I can’t wait to hear him explain that! But he seems convinced as well that there are a lot of significant inferences that can be drawn from the data. That’s really exciting!

Secondly, I’ve been devouring the latest references sent by my supervisor–a set of new articles on epistemological research in Asia, just freshly published. Liem and Bernardo (2010) also confirm a suspicion that we’ve been nursing all these months as we discussed the results of our survey with regard to Certainty Knowledge: A number of the items deal more with whether or not effort will eventually lead to knowledge. Not exactly or directly measuring beliefs about the certainty of knowledge, are they?

Finally, Hofer’s overview article on the “burgeoning research on Asian epistemology” is quite encouraging and provides helpful directions. First of all, she affirms the use of Chan and Elliott’s revised version of the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ), known today as the Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (EBQ), citing it as the more reliable instrument in Asia. What I find most exciting is Hofer’s encouragement to future Asian researchers (like myself!) not to strait-jacket ourselves by simply allowing our instrument to limit our construct. In other words, don’t let the measure define what we’re supposed to measured. I find this consoling because I’m not happy about merely replicating the four-structure model of Chan & Elliott–or even that of Schommer. In his study of Filipino pre-service teachers, Bernardo (2008, 2009) has come up with a two-dimensional model of epistemological beliefs about learning–i.e., the simplicity and structure of learning. But beliefs about learning are, for Hofer and many like her, “less” epistemological compared to Certainty Knowledge, for example, or Authority/Expert Knowledge. This means that it makes sense to exert effort in reading the data beyond the usual light.

That sounds as exciting as skiing down Mont Blanc!

City of motorcycles

Flying back to Manila this morning after two weeks of thinking about my thesis and wrestling with my writing. It’s been a great hiatus for me here in Taipei, which will always be for me the city of motorcycles.

The big ideas swirling in my head are all about why epistemology–those hidden beliefs about knowledge and knowing–are so important in education.  What’s the big deal with epistemology anyway–especially now that our school is beginning to offer this IB course Theory of Knowledge to our students?  Schommer (1994) comes up with an excellent and lucid summary of what the research claims are the effects of one’s personal epistemology on learning.  She names four:

(a)  Active engagement in learning:  Some students believe that learning is simply passive listening, as in Belenky et al’s (1986) Silence and Received Knowledge.  If that is the case, the students will never really get engaged in learning as an active participant and will keep relying on that sage on the stage.  Moreover, active learning is unlikely to happen if one isn’t a big believer in one’s self as a source of knowledge and relies completely and uncritically on expert opinion (such as the teacher in the classroom).

(b) Persistence in difficult tasks:  Those who believe that one’s intelligence is fixed and unchanging (fixed theorists) get negative and give up when facing difficult tasks.  Confronted with easier tasks, they perform as well as the so-called “incremental theorists” who believe that one’s ability can improve in time, but when it comes to more challenging questions, the incremental theorists out-perform them.  Likewise for those who believe that learning is quick and does not require time and effort–they become impatient and give up.

(c) Comprehension especially of academic texts:  Several studies have shown that beliefs about knowledge and knowing that are more advanced equip students in their reading comprehension.

(d) Dealing with ill-structured problems:  Well-structured problems (defined as questions with clear-cut answers and clear-cut ways of solving) don’t really touch on one’s epistemology.  But dealing with ill-structured problems–or controversies–where “reasonable people can reasonably disagree” and which, by the way, are probably 75% of all problems we deal with outside the classroom, is very much enhanced when one has a more sophisticated conception of knowledge–that it isn’t simple and always certain and that one has to engage in independent reasoning (apart from relying on authority).

What’s important here, I think, is that even if we don’t talk about the students’ epistemologies, the often-unconscious epistemological beliefs of the teachers shape their students’ own epistemological development.  The cues they send through their type of instruction and examinations teach students what knowledge is and what processes one should take to obtain knowledge.  Teachers canonize particular epistemological beliefs even without discussing them explicitly.

Ontology pertains to one’s belief about the nature of knowledge (as simple/complex and certain/uncertain); it classifies one as a Realist (only one correct answer) or a Perspectivist (more than one possible correct answers).  Ontology, therefore, is the factor that distinguishes an Absolutist from a Multiplist and an Evaluativist.

Decidability is whether one believes that rational procedures can settle a question, making one either a Rationalist or a Non-Rationalist.  Decidability tells us if one even bothers to justify or not.   Fallibility tells us if one recognizes the possibility of being wrong.  Decidability seems to be related to the justification of knowledge, while Fallibility is related to the source of knowledge, but the relationship isn’t as direct.

Based on these three categories, Gottlieb generates 8 epistemic types or orientations:

Does Gottlieb shed light on epistemological worldviews and their relationships to epistemological beliefs pertaining to the nature, source, and justification of knowledge?   It seems that the relationship to the nature of knowledge is pretty self-evident, but with regard to the source and justification of knowledge, there is no one-to-one correspondence.

I actually thought that an Absolutist relies on Authority, Multiplist relies on Opinion, and Evaluativist relies on Evidence—exclusively.  Not true.   That would be oversimplification.   Everyone uses all three ways of justifying knowledge; the difference lies in the priority or weight that one gives to each of them.   For example, an EVALUATIVIST ought to be open to all three:  Authority, Opinion, and Evidence.  Depending on the discipline/domain, the appropriate weight is given to each one.

In Gottlieb’s typology, an Evaluativist will have to be a Rationalist Perspectivist, certainly a MODEST PERSPECTIVIST (Fallibilist + Rationalist) if he is truly open to Evidence, one who recognizes the possibility of being wrong.

But would an Evaluativist also be a CONFIDENT PERSPECTIVIST (Infallibilist + Rationalist)?  A Confident Perspectivist believes that a rational procedure may be employed in answering a given question, but does not think it is possible to be wrong.  In this sense, therefore, EVIDENCE doesn’t seem to play as important a role as AUTHORITY and OPINION since an openness to evidence ought to make one Fallibilist.  It would seem then that a CONFIDENT PERSPECTIVIST is a MULTIPLIST.  A Multiplist is a Perspectivist who relies more on one’s own opinion—even if the opinion is partly based on what the experts say.

Easily, Gottlieb’s Non-Rationalist Perspectivist will have to be MULTIPLIST and not EVALUATIVIST.  Because a Non-Rationalist Perspectivist does not recognize the role of reason, then there is no way that s/he can be an Evaluativist.   Whether s/he is a Tragic Perspectivist (Fallible + Non-Rationalist) or a Confident Perspectivist (Infallible + Non-Rationalist) almost doesn’t matter.   It must be noted, however, that the CONFIDENT PERSPECTIVIST would be the stereotypical Multiplist.

Remarkably, there is more than one type of Absolutist, and they can be distinguished from one another according to Gottlieb’s categories of Fallibility and Decidability.  It’s already clear that all of them subscribe to the Simple/Certain ontology of Knowledge, but what about in terms of the source of knowledge and its justification?

According to Gottlieb’s Epistemic Types/Orientations, there are four types of Realists or Absolutists:

a)    Modest:    Fallible and Rationalist
b)    Tragic:        Fallible and Non-Rationalist
c)    Confident:    Infallible and Rationalist
d)    Dogmatic:    Infallible and Non-Rationalist

The stereotypical Absolutist would be the Non-Rationalist Realist.  The DOGMATIC REALIST (Infallible + Non-Rationalist) relies on Authority and, even if this isn’t acknowledged, Opinion.  The TRAGIC REALIST (Fallible + Non-Rationalist) is the same except that s/he recognizes that Authority and Opinion can be mistaken.

But there is still the Rationalist Realist, who believes that reason can help answer questions. The MODEST REALIST (Fallible + Rationalist) comes closest to the Evaluativist, justifying knowledge claims based on Authority, Opinion, and Reason—the only difference from the Evaluativist being one’s ontology of knowledge.  The CONFIDENT REALIST (Infallible + Rationalist), on the other hand, probably gives more weight to Authority and Opinion more than an objective assessment of Evidence.

In summary then, the MODEST PERSPECTIVIST is the epitome of the Evaluativist, believing in Evidence and in the true spirit of reason, the possibility of error.

The stereotypical Absolutist is the DOGMATIC REALIST (Infallibilist + Non-Rationalist), relying on Authority and Opinion more than Evidence because s/he believes that reason doesn’t play an important role in justification and that s/he can’t be wrong!

The stereotypical Multiplist is the DOGMATIC PERSPECTIVIST (Infallibilist + Non-Rationalist), similar to the Dogmatic Realist in relying on Authority and Opinion (not on Evidence).

Insight #1:  Not all Absolutists and not all Multiplists are DOGMATIC (Infallibilist + Non-Rationalist).   Between them are a whole range of more reasonable Absolutists and Multiplists—e.g., the MODEST REALIST who seems to come closest to the Evaluativist, believing in reason and the possibility of error, but espousing a different view of the nature of knowledge.

Insight #2:  One’s ontology of knowledge depends on the domain/discipline—whether it is art, morality, social sciences, physical sciences, or even religion.  In previous discussions, to think of a person sophisticated in the area of religion as an Evaluativist raised a lot of questions—and eyebrows—because is there really more than one supernatural reality?  Perhaps the better category is Gottlieb’s Modest Realist.

If only for that, Gottlieb does shed some light.

Kuangchi Program Service

This is the long-delayed Part II to Canberra.  Here’s where I resume my writing.  I will probably spend the first phase of it just recalling where I left off as I had done at the House of Writers in Canberra.

This time, however, I’m hiding away in Kuangchi Program Service in Taipei, where I spent two years as a regent back in the early 90s for my media training.  It’s a historic media production house started by the Jesuits decades ago, and it has left an indelible mark on the history of Taiwan television and documentaries.

I arrived the other day a little before noon, getting off the express bus at the Sogo Department Store at the intersection of 忠孝 and 復興 Roads.  It was a sunny day, so I decided to walk to Kuangchi just a few blocks down the road.  As I was waiting for the elevator door to open, one of the janitors recognized me and said hello. That was a nice welcome.

The Jesuit residence on the 4th floor was abandoned, so on my own, I found a room and assumed it was for me until Jerry Martinson came over later to show me a much more spacious room.  It used to be the room of the late Bob Ronald, my spiritual director.  I miss Bob.

There’s something about Kuangchi that makes me feel so much at home.  Too bad that they will soon tear down this building.  This may well be the last time I get to stay here!  I’m going to try to accomplish two things here:  Do some serious writing and stop worrying about school.

Yesterday, I did some actual writing, focusing on a couple of big ideas about epistemological development.  What I found interesting is the insight that the two shifts that span the three epistemological stages correspond to changes in particular epistemological beliefs.  The first has to do with one’s view of the nature of knowledge (whether simple/complex or certain/uncertain). This “Perspectivist Shift” seems to be a prerequisite of epistemological development since one’s view of simple and certain knowledge undergoes a revision into one that recognizes its complex and uncertain nature; hence, the possibility and legitimacy of multiple perspectives.

The second epistemological shift deals with how one relies on authority or expert knowledge (whether uncritical or critical).  This critical stance towards authority–sometimes leading to outright rejection or a virtual rebellion–seems to be a condition for the third shift, which has to do with the justification of knowledge, specifically, the role of the self.  The self takes on a more active and independent role vis-a-vis authority and other external sources of knowledge.

More than ever, I realize that writing is thinking–disciplined thinking–something we so easily take for granted.  Even as I wrote that, I returned to my draft for some revision of thought.

I’m tempted to be purely task-oriented and be concerned about getting the writing done.  But the more important goal, the more valuable gift here in Taipei, is the space and silence to think, wrestle with, and understand this animal called epistemology.

Image via Wikipedia

I  stumbled over this Venn Diagram that represents the classical definition of knowledge and relates it to the concepts of truth and beliefs.  It’s a diagram worth thinking about as it may help allow ideas to connect and fall in the right places.  These would seem to be the main ideas of the diagram:

First:  Knowledge is the intersection of beliefs and truths, the overlap between the two.  The classical definition is that knowledge is justified beliefs–in other words, beliefs that have been shown to conform to truths.

Second:  There are areas of beliefs that do not conform to truths. These are unjustified beliefs–or beliefs that are, simply put, wrong.  Similarly, there are areas of truths not covered or not yet covered by beliefs.  These would be truths that we know not of yet and do not have any stance in.

While the diagram is appealingly simple, it, of course, seems to have its limitations.  First, that “truths” are out there, and the definite area of truths will eventually be or at least possibly covered by beliefs, turning them into knowledge (knowledge as certain and simple?).

Secondly, what of beliefs that cannot be validated or justified with reason–i.e., beliefs that we choose to take on even if authority and evidence don’t agree about them?  Where would we find these in the diagram?  An example of these would be epistemological beliefs.  They can’t be verified, but we hold them and can choose to subscribe to some of them after examining them, but we can’t really know if these beliefs conform to the truth.

As usual, questions, not answers.  There is really more from where all this comes from.

I was spent after my meeting with the teachers of Ateneo de Naga High School. It was my ninth session of presenting the results of the epistemological survey, so I didn’t really expect to learn anything new. But to my surprise, I still did. It might have been the engagement and interest of the teachers in the discussion that did it. I guess there’s always more where it comes from.

While talking about the four epistemological beliefs, I realized that what was true of epistemological word views is also true about the epistemological beliefs.  When I was discussing the beliefs on the role of authority and the nature of knowledge, I felt that I should have nuanced my discussion in terms of the disciplines.   In short, just as the world views differed from field to field, so one’ beliefs about the role of authority and the nature of knowledge changed.  Scientific knowledge, for example, would have a different way of using authority as basis for the justification of knowledge compared to religious knowledge or aesthetic knowledge.

However, the domain-dependence of these two core beliefs about knowing would not apply to the more peripheral beliefs about learning (process and ability).  In plainer language:  Whether we believe that learning requires effort (process) or that intelligence is inborn and fixed is probably the same across disciplines.

More importantly, I stumbled over a clearer connection between epistemological world views and beliefs.  The world views had to do with one’s beliefs on the justification of knowledge per domain, which had for its basis the role of authority and the nature of knowledge.  Only those who view knowledge as complex and uncertain (Gottlieb‘s term for this is perspectivist as distinguished from realist) would be able to move from an absolutist world view to a relativist or evaluativist world view.

Moreover, only those who can be more critical about what authority says can likewise shift to the two more sophisticated world views.  Depending on their disposition towards authority, they would be either relativist or evaluativist: Relativist referring to a stance that altogether overthrows authority and installs one’s own opinion on the pedestal, and evaluativist pertaining to a less radical, but more critical disposition that assesses expert claims in the light of other available evidences.

Sacred Heart teachers in a hesitant show of hands

Waiting to board in Mactan airport.  This afternoon we had a joint session of the Grade School and High School teachers of Sacred Heart School-Jesuit/Ateneo de Cebu (Why do some schools like all these tediously slashed names?).  I’m afraid the teachers enjoyed the air-conditioned auditorium and their comfortable chairs much more than the discussion. 

But as always, discussions like this one—no matter how labored and boring—do yield certain insights.  This afternoon, this nth session with teachers, what crystallized was the relative role of authority, opinion, and evidence in the different fields and subject areas. There is a need for teachers to discuss this question with others teaching the same subject.  What is the role of these three in assessing knowledge claims in a particular field?  Which one is the weightiest?  Is there room for the others?  In what way are they related to one another in justifying knowledge in that discipline?

If it’s possible, it will be helpful, I think, to fill out a table similar to this one:

In the Physical Sciences, for example, Evidence is clearly the most crucial factor, but Authority (science experts) comes as a close second, and Opinion—despite impressions to the contrary—does have a role of some sort.

In the Social Sciences, the relationships among Evidence, Opinion, and Authority change.

Compare that to Religion and Morality, where what constitutes as Evidence is different and may not be as self-evident and therefore, “compelling” as Scientific Evidence.   No wonder Opinion and Authority play a more important role.

Will it be helpful to ask the following questions per discipline:

a)     Which of the three has a role to play in the justification of knowledge in a particular discipline?

b)    Which one is considered the weightiest and most important?

c)     What is the relationships among the three?

Today’s session brought about questions more than answers.  Knowledge is indeed complex and uncertain.

Tying loose ends

This morning I finished my last session here in Zamboanga, where most of the teachers in the Ateneo de Zamboanga Grade School, based on the survey results have a predominantly contextualist world view.  It’s a weird thing considering that they’re a Grade School and that they’re outside Metro Manila. You would ordinarily expect to find such sophistication in a high school in the National Capital Region.  Needless to say, the group was thrilled when I mentioned this even if I qualified that the hierarchy of epistemological world views is under debate.

What have I learned in this morning’s discussion as well as yesterday’s session with the Ateneo de Zamboanga High School?  Anything new?  Anything novel?  An a-ha experience of any sort?

I’m beginning to understand better the links that have been established between epistemological world views and beliefs:  For example, the notion of knowledge as simple and certain and an uncritical reliance on Authority (from the Schommer and Chan and Elliott frameworks) are features of an Absolutist World View.   The three big ideas on the “development” of world views about knowing indicate this:

a)  Chai (2006):  Epistemological development is characterized by two movements.  First, a growing recognition of the complexity and uncertainty of knowledge. This objective conception of knowledge as simple and certain is accompanied by a heavy reliance on authority and a naive expectation that every question corresponds to a single correct answer); and second, the increasingly important role of the knower as an agent relative to authority and external sources of knowledge.  In the second relativist stage, the knower accepts the complexity and uncertainty of knowledge but relegates knowledge claims to matters of individual preference.  In other words, Authority has been replaced by Opinion.  In the final evaluativist stage, the acceptance of knowledge as complex and uncertain leads not to an abandonment of evaluation, but a commitment to the responsibility of evaluating knowledge claims based on Evidence and others’–including experts’–opinions.

b) Baxter-Magolda (2004) and King and Kitchener (2004) explain these movements further:  There are two epistemological shifts that happen.  The first pertains to one’s view about the nature of knowledge–i.e., “a disillusionment with the black and white and a discovery of gray areas.”  This shift in one’s notion of knowledge leads to a more active role of the knower, an “end to enslavement to authority.”  No longer does the knower merely receive absolute truths from authority, byt now constructs truths.  But because these constructed truths are not supported by evidence, they are mere PERSONAL or SUBJECTIVE TRUTHS (hence, the subjectivist/relativist/multiplist stance).

The second shift pertains to the construction of REASONED TRUTHS, made possible only when the knower uses EVIDENCE to evaluate which of the multiple truths or knowledge claims is preferable.  One’s “rebellion against authority” is now tempered because authority now facilitates the construction of reasoned truths.  Authority is no longer regarded as always “speaking ex cathedra” (i.e., infallible); it is respected, but subjected to scrutiny.

c) Kuhn & Park:  Epistemological Development is presented as the coordination of the Objective and the Subjective.  As one transitions from one level to the next, the objective and subjective dimensions of knowing become increasingly coordinated and balanced.   From absolutist to multiplist, the order of change begins with the softer domains (personal tastes, aesthetics, even values) and ends with the “harder” ones (social truths and especially physical truths).   This order is reversed when it comes to the next shift, from the multiplist to evaluativist, so that the change begins with the physical truths and social truths to the softer domains.

More importantly, I’m able to make better sense of the roles of Authority, Opinion, and Evidence in terms of the world views.  To wit:

* Knowledge in any given field, discipline, or domain somehow involves all three (A, O, and E) in the justification of knowledge. However, the role each one plays vis-a-vis one another varies from discipline to discipline.  E.g., the roles of Authority, Opinion, and Evidence differ in Art, Morality, Social Sciences, Physical Sciences, and Religion.  For example, in the Physical Sciences, Evidence would take precedence over Authority, followed by Opinion (which still has a role to play!).  On the other hand, in Morality, for example, given its nature, Evidence may not play such a primary or even exclusive role.  What precisely are their roles will need some more reflection and study.

* The dynamics of these three arbiters of knowledge or the bases for justification of knowledge have a lot to do with one constitutes knowledge in a given field.  For example, scientific knowledge as distinguished from social scientific knowledge, morality, religion, etc.

There are actually more loose ends to think about.